ABSTRACT
When considering Alexius Meinong's treatment of the mind and associated issues, we confront an oddity. The sense in which he does not have a philosophy of mind as such is that he is singularly unconcerned with otherwise standard categories such as Geist or Psyche, which words hardly occur at all in his philosophical vocabulary. The obverse of this lack of ontological or methodological Angst about mind is that Meinong takes it for granted that we are consciously related to a world beyond our own experiences, a world of material and ideal, and even non-existent things. In 1894, a younger Brentano student Kazimierz Twardowski published his Habilitationsschrift with the title Zur Lehre vom Inhalt und Gegenstand der Vorstellungen Objects of cognitions are predicative in nature, and are linguistically expressed by whole sentences or clauses, not by names or phrases like presentations. Objectives quickly came to play a central part in Meinong's developing theory of objects.
