ABSTRACT
The author outlines philosophical accounts of intentionality proposed between 1300 and 1600. It focuses on intellectual cognition and set sense perception aside. He examines what function (if any) was assigned to representations in theories of intellectual cognition and how this assignment was linked to fundamental assumptions about the mind's ontology and causality. He considers scholastic authors who epitomise emblematic views on intentionality, namely Ockham, several Renaissance Aristotelians and Su+írez. Alexander instead of Aquinas, Zabarella denies abstraction to be a function of the agent intellect; it is rather the receptive intellect that, once affected by phantasms, turns them into adequate representations, or likenesses, of universal essences. Pomponazzi draws radical consequences from this view; insisting on the intellect's efficient-causal dependence on phantasms, he rejects both the tenet of the intellect's immateriality and FAA, thus taking refuge in indirect realism to explain the intentionality of intellectual cognition.
