ABSTRACT
In developing the common account of soul in De Anima (DA) II.1, Aristotle aspires to cover any soul of any kind of mortal living being. Most of Aristotle's predecessors explained perception by the action of like upon like. Thus Empedocles proposed, "For 'tis by Earth we see Earth, by Water Water". The soul as substantial form of the living being is substance in a different way from the composite living being. Aristotle is careful to deny that the soul is subject or substratum for motion. Aristotle must suppose that speaking of things as "in the soul" will not result in serious misunderstanding. The hylomorphic account looks well suited to explicate the relation of soul and body in general and to account for the basic life principle, nutritive capacity. Hylomorphism, as elaborated in Aristotle's accounts of the soul and its functions, has in our time received two prominent sorts of criticism.
