ABSTRACT
This chapter focusses on the interrelations between copyright law and the understanding of the creative process and creativity under cognitive psychology and creativity studies. It argues that although there is a significant match between various copyright doctrines and creativity studies, there is a mismatch as far as derivative works are concerned. The main goal of this chapter is to argue that the distinction between derivative works and original works under copyright law is a legal one, that cannot be based on the understanding of the creative process. Therefore, it suggests that there is no qualitative difference between original and derivative works as far as creativity is concerned, and thus the distinction created by law must be reexamined in light of the normative justifications for copyright. To support this argument, various theoretical approaches and empirical and historical researches from the field of creativity studies are discussed. Based on such approaches it suggests that the cognitive process of creativity could be divided into two main stages. The first refers to unfocussed thought in which abstract thought is generated. The second refers to the crystallization of abstract thought to concrete products based on the use of prior domain-relevant knowledge and memory, that include specific expressions and not merely ideas.
