ABSTRACT
First attempts to launch a sort of cooperation in this field
at the European level are quite faraway. The European Atomic
Energy Community (EURATOM) founded in 1957 can be deemed
the first example of the European integration in research and
innovation policy (Grande, 2001, p. 912). However, after the crisis of
EURATOM inmid-1960s the cooperation among European countries
was prevalently outside the Community framework such as in the
aviator sector with the Anglo-French collaboration in Concorde
and the Franco-German one relating to Airbus. Moreover, in 1975
the European Space Agency was established in the framework
of international organizations, thus, again, outside the European
Community’s scope. In this period, the Community efforts towards
a greater internal cooperation failed. For instance, the Community
cooperation in data processing (Eurodata, Unidata) in late 1960s
and 1970s did not gain the expected success. In 1980s the decline
of European industries in key sectors such as microelectronics and
data processing and the US dominance in international markets
with the surge of new key actors, such as Japan, led to a favourable
climate triggered by the ‘technology gap’ debate (Grande, 2001, p.
912). With the First Framework Program (FP1) in 1983 the ground
for a common research and innovation policy at the Community
level was established. In following years, a ‘new generation of
programs’ tried to foster the growth of high-tech industries deemed
strategic in fostering the economic development and industry
competitiveness (Grande, 2001, p. 912). For example, in early 1980s
a new Community’s program in R&D in information technology
industry, called ESPRIT, became the ‘flagship’ in technology policy
in Europe (Grande, 2001, p. 913). From 1998 with the FP5 to the
2000 Lisbon Treaty the European Union pushed to the integration
between States and innovation, as well as their funding. In this
cultural climate, research in emerging technologies was increasingly
perceived as fundamental in pursuing the goal of making the Europe
one of the most competitive economies in the world, together
with US and Japan.2 In this regard in 2000 the European Research
Area (ERA) initiative was established at the European Council with
the aim of overcoming ‘national borders through direct funding,
increased mobility, and streamlined innovation policies’ (Grande,
2001, p. 913). The ERA’s ambition was of creating the fifth freedom
in Europe, namely the freedom of circulation of knowledge and
knowledge workers in order to lead to a ‘new renaissance’ for
Europe (de Saille, 2015). Thus ERA was partially implemented
through the FP6, leading to major changes with regard to the
organization of research in Europe. Not only in research funding
we can count a new meaningful trend. To the detriment of the
States’ domestic jurisdiction, Community acquired new skills and
competencies in several areas that are strategic for the regulation
of technological developments and the industrial competitiveness.
Guidelines for environmental protection, regulation of genetic
engineering, the liberalization of communication markets and data
protection transformed the European Union in one of the potential
key actors on the worldwide scene (Grande, 2001, p. 913). In this
framework emerging technologies were increasingly perceived by
the EU authorities as an extraordinary mean to fill the gap with
other economies. In front of the continuous rise of new promising
research fields, such as nanotechnology and synthetic biology, past
experiences with GMOs gave the European Union the chance to find
a wiser way to cope with the challenges of an ever-evolving world.
In this sense the experience with biotechnology sector became a
warning for each subsequent policy on emerging technologies. If
there are lessons to learn from it, they are the need of a greater
involvement of the public (societal trust is fundamental for the
success), a greater transparency (the rejection of the ‘substantial
equivalence’ criterion, or of the artificial process/product distinc-
tion which would justify the lack of labelling), a new approach to the
precautionary principle, which would not neglect it or overestimate
it (Metha, 2004). In particular, two directions seem to be recognized
in new technology policy in Europe: a better engagement of society
at early stage and a greater anticipation of both positive and negative
impacts of technology (Mandel, 2009). It is a common knowledge
that in emerging technologies actors are distributed at the global
level and the success or the failure of a field depends on the
rate of contribution of all parties (industries, enterprises, research
institutions, researchers, funding organizations, policymakers, non-
governmental organizations, civil society, etc.) (Ferrarese, 2010, p.
needs to be cultivated through the right balance among governance
tools, and, consequently, the distrust is the worst misfortune in
technology policy (Mandel, 2013, p. 60). For this reason, given the
current state of scientific, ethic and regulatory uncertainty related to
emerging technologies, the research community shares the opinion
that governance should be adaptive, proactive and flexible by
escaping forms of regulation too hard influenced by command-and-
control style (Mandel, 2013; Widmer et al. 2010; Kearnes and Rip,
2009; Stoke and Bowman, 2012). This governance model should
be able to adapt the existing regulations and to evolve following
the data gathering in order to respond to changing knowledge and
information, to foster self-regulatory attitude of all parties, to widen
the stakeholders’ participation, thus anticipating the regulator even
at early stage (Mandel, 2013, p. 59).
