ABSTRACT

Public choice, an important subdiscipline in the field of political theory, seeks to understand how people and societies make decisions affecting their collective lives. Relying heavily on theoretical models of decision making, public choice postulates that people act in their individual interests in making collective decisions. As it happens, however, reality does not mirror theory, and people often act contrary to what the principal public choice models suggest. In this book, Russell Hardin looks beyond the models to find out why people choose to act together in situations that the models find quite hopeless. He uses three constructs of modern political economy--public goods, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and game theory--to test public choice theories against real world examples of collective action. These include movements important in American society in the past few decades--civil rights, the Vietnam War, women's rights, and environmental concerns. This classic work on public choice will be of interest to theoreticians and graduate students in the fields of public choice, political economy, or political theory--and to those in other disciplines who are concerned with the problem of collective action in social contexts.

chapter |5 pages

Introduction

chapter 1|10 pages

The Back of the Invisible Hand

chapter 2|22 pages

Collective Action and Prisoner's Dilemma

chapter 3|12 pages

Group Size

chapter 4|17 pages

Types of Collective Action Problems

chapter 5|23 pages

Asymmetries in Collective Action

chapter 6|11 pages

Contractarian Provisions

chapter 7|24 pages

Extrarational Motivations

chapter 8|13 pages

Dynamic Analysis of Collective Action

chapter 9|17 pages

Rationality in the Prisoner's Dilemma

chapter 10|18 pages

Contract by Convention

chapter 11|15 pages

Enforcement of Conventions

chapter 12|18 pages

Limits to Contract by Convention

chapter 13|14 pages

Contract By Convention in Social Theory

chapter 14|11 pages

Contract by Convention in Politics