ABSTRACT
The conclusion offers new frameworks for development scholars to consider. Local-development funds in Ghana resemble a common-pool resource that is poorly managed and over-extracted, leading to negative outcomes. For each player, there is uncertainty about income, which impels them to extract funds from procurement. This chapter proposes the elimination of sealed-bid procurement in local-development projects in favor of a system where publicly identified contractors can be guaranteed—on a known rotation basis—the opportunity to choose suitable contracts. Such a system can reduce income uncertainty for contractors. Party chairs should be involved with establishing the public lists of contractors to ensure that qualified party loyalists are on those lists. Donors can help local communities to create rules for dispute resolution and provide objective monitors to ensure project quality. This chapter also gives scholars and donors a framework for thinking about local development actors as antiheroes—that is, those actors have heroic tendencies but must play various games to survive in the political sphere. Development scholars and practitioners should explore ways to alleviate the pressures of those games, while still working with the political machines to provide quality goods and services.
