ABSTRACT
This chapter introduces the foundational elements necessary to understand the new theory of conscientious objection developed in this book. First, the debate about refusing childhood vaccinations is examined to discern some key factors for assessing conscience objections. The focus turns squarely to conscientious refusals by medical professionals by outlining the nature of conscientious objection and introducing the concept of public reason advanced by John Rawls. This idea—that reasonable political values to be introduced into the public square are those that others as free and equal could be expected reasonably to endorse—is utilized as an overarching principle to determine what constitutes a reasonable ground for conscientious objections in society. The chapter then establishes that on the reason-giving view on conscientious objection defended herein, providers seeking a conscientious exemption must publicly state their objection and its reasoned basis; when a provider’s grounds are reasonable, the Reasonability View can extend an accommodation. This chapter outlines an account of professional responsibility influenced by Edmund Pellegrino to establish the first moral imperative of disclosing medical fact to vulnerable patients, and then examines the concept of moral complicity to justify the requirement that even for contested services, objecting medical professionals must provide referrals.
