ABSTRACT
This chapter focusses on possible explanations of the “fit” between the inclinations of human nature and pre-rational, factual forms of normativity. Although a solution to the problem of fit would be required for the foundation of the practical normativity of fit, for the purposes of this chapter, it is enough to suggest that rational arguments for the explanation of fit have to be admitted in the political arena, at the practical level, when members of the community support them. On the one hand, the chapter claims that an ultimate explanation of the relevant fit is not a condition of the possibility of practical reasoning, and that this means that not all agents must raise ultimate, foundational questions in order to be rationally justified in their actions. On the other hand, the chapter suggests that rational arguments underscore three possible explanations of fit, i.e. chance, teleology immanent in nature or intentional, rational choice. Although the latter view is not necessarily theistic, theism is a possible way to spell it out. The upshot is that the religious views of citizens might have enough rational credibility to be admitted in public arguments about the common good.
