ABSTRACT
This chapter shows what the author takes Kant's argument for God's existence to be. It explains how the argument is intended to work and why it supports, in Kant's sense, belief but not knowledge. To see why the argument supports belief but not knowledge, the chapter explores Kant's distinction between Glauben and Wissen; this, in turn, leads to investigation of the difference between subjectively sufficient grounds for a holding-to-be-true and objectively sufficient grounds for a holding-to-be-true. When Kant characterizes the conclusion of the argument for God's existence as something we are to believe or have faith in, rather than something we know, he invites many a twentieth-century reader to view his argument as something other than an epistemic justification. Finally, the chapter rounds out the argument concerning the epistemic wherewithal of practical reason by considering the nature of the distinction Kant actually draws between the practical and the theoretical.
