ABSTRACT
One feature of debates about skeptical arguments that has largely been overlooked by contemporary Anglo-analytic philosophers is that they are pervasive across a number of philosophical traditions. Some of the most general and powerful skeptical arguments—such as arguments from regress, arguments from circularity, and arguments from skeptical hypotheses—have been proposed, and attacked, by ancient and medieval Greek and Hellenistic, Indian, Chinese, and a variety of modern and contemporary philosophers alike. In other words, skepticism (as well as resistance to it) is in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon. Because of this, it cries out for a cross-cultural explanation: that is, an account of why this is so. In this paper, I argue that the view that believing is knowing is a primary conceptual metaphor (which I characterize as a form of epistemic fictionalism) promises to provide at least the beginnings of such an explanation. I first briefly explain what primary conceptual metaphors are before going on to explain why believing is knowing is plausibly among them. Following that, I show how this account can be used to offer a unified (if partial) response to three particularly pressing philosophical questions: i) Why are skeptical arguments appealing?; ii) Why are skeptical arguments difficult to accept? and; iii) Why are these features of skeptical arguments widespread? In other words, why is skepticism (as well as resistance to it) in some sense a cross-cultural phenomenon?
