ABSTRACT
We are all capable, under normal circumstances, to access the content of our minds, such as our thoughts and feelings. Moreover, it seems that we are in a better position to do this than others are. Although this epistemological distinctiveness is often exaggerated, it is undeniable that we enjoy a first-person authority about our own mental states. Theories of self-knowledge all seek to explain or explain away these features of epistemic privilege and first-person authority. This chapter does not seek to adjudicate between these theories. Instead, it focuses on a particular claim, the ‘transparency thesis,’ which is invoked in some accounts of self-knowledge. It is claimed that the procedure that follows from this thesis constitutes the core of our self-attributions. Theories that appeal to such a procedure are, however, often accused of failing to justify their epistemic credentials. This chapter aims at providing a new interpretation of the transparency procedure that wears its epistemic credentials on its sleeve. It will be argued that the dispositional account of the structure of epistemic reasons can make an epistemic sense of the transparency procedure.
