ABSTRACT
It is controversial how normative reasons bear on the rationality of actions and beliefs, especially when the standard conception of normative reasons is combined with the thesis that rationality requires that we correctly respond to our reasons. We can easily conceive of cases where what objective reasons there are, in fact, and what objective reasons we take to exist come apart. It seems, however, that rationality only requires responding to the latter type of reasons. This seems to suggest that reasons that justify actions and beliefs are those that are possessed by the agent. But what is it that constitutes the possession of reasons? This chapter focuses mainly on the possession conditions of epistemic reasons. It will be concerned with the requirements that have to be met if such reasons are to discharge their justifying function. It begins by motivating a particular condition, namely, the ‘treating’ requirement that has been deemed to be necessary for possessing reasons. After providing an opinionated introduction to some of the central issues in the literature on reasons and normativity, this chapter offers a dispositional account of reason-possession in which the treating condition features prominently. This will be followed by the clarification of certain outstanding issues.
