ABSTRACT

This chapter starts the final part of the book that addresses potential security threats associated with biomolecular quantitative analysis. In this chapter, an assessment of the following security vulnerabilities is provided: (1) bioassay-result manipulation, which can be triggered by bioassay-level attacks; (2) insecure cyber-physical integration in microfluidic biochips, which can form a backdoor for system-level attacks; (3) forgery of biomolecular samples, which is imposed by biochemical-level attacks. First, result-manipulation attacks on a DMFB are identified, where these attacks can maliciously alter the assay outcomes. Two practical result-manipulation attacks are shown on a digital microfluidic platform that performs enzymatic glucose reactions on serum. Second, we identify vulnerabilities of the current design flow for cyber-physical microfluidic systems that can represent an obvious attack surface. We show that a cyber-physical system design that was intended for error recovery can be abused by a malicious attacker to leak sensitive information or launch sensor-spoofing attacks. Third, a benchtop experimental study is presented to demonstrate three different attacks on DNA preparation for gene-expression analysis: positive denial-of-service attack, negative denial-of-service attack, and sample switching/forgery attack. The proposed study explains the severe impact of each attack on the outcome of the DNA-identification process.