ABSTRACT
The concept of asymmetrical federalism disguised the way that national norms guaranteeing individual rights, legal standards and the development of a national market were undermined by regional leaders, often undermining their own representative assemblies. However, in terms of Riker's notion of a 'federal bargain', which he defines as 'a bargain between prospective national leaders and officials of constituent governments for the purpose of aggregating territory, the better to lay taxes and raise armies', Russian federalism is deficient. Asymmetrical federalism allowed the flexible negotiation of individual tailor-made solutions to Russia's diverse ethnic and political composition, but it failed to do this within the framework of equal and universal citizenship rights. Segmented regionalism and asymmetrical federalism were encouraged by the political economy of the post-Soviet period. For some this was no more than a new form of Russia's traditional centralism; others argued that it offered an opportunity to move away from asymmetrical federalism towards a more balanced form.
