ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses only one sort of memory, which is such that there are important differences between it and other sorts of memory; but the fact that for our purposes only one sort of memory is interesting does not entitle us to say that the other sorts are not really memory at all. Various theories of memory have been advanced, all of them anxious to be as little removed as possible, if at all, from the view of common sense. One sometimes comes across an objection to the theory, that memory cannot be explained in terms of familiarity, because familiarity presupposes memory. Now, to state the matter like that, that familiarity presupposes memory, disguises the fact that there are two objections, which need to be kept distinct from each other. The context in which the words ‘memory’ and ‘remember’ are used may by itself leave their meaning ambiguous, as for instance when one speaks of remembering a person.
