ABSTRACT
This chapter begins by providing a detailed explanation of the traditional approach to shareholder participation in the public company, and a comprehensive exploration of the reasoning behind this approach of limiting the participation of shareholders. Accordingly, in applying the interpretative rule to what is known as the oppressive or unfair prejudice remedy, what is ‘oppression’ or ‘unfair’ to shareholders would, first and foremost, be determined according to whether the relevant conduct falls short of satisfying the happiness criteria for shareholders of the company. Shareholder participation has been an area of particular focus during the corporate governance reform ‘movement’. Improving corporate governance practices within corporations through measures to enhance shareholder participation is certainly a favourable development, and is something to which lawmakers and regulators throughout the world are devoting much of their attention. The Revised Combined Code, released in July 2003 by the United Kingdom Financial Reporting Council, highlights the limitation on shareholder participation underlying the recent corporate governance reform movement.
