ABSTRACT

This volume analyzes US policy toward communist-ruled Poland in the fields of diplomacy, economy, culture, and public diplomacy. It highlights the limitations in developing cooperation between democratic and nondemocratic countries resulting from the Cold War conflict.

No comprehensive account of US policy toward Poland from 1956 to 1968 has emerged in historiography. This book aims to answer why, since the political changes of the Polish October 1956, Washington ceased to see Polish affairs as “Soviet-related matters.” Instead, it recognized communist-ruled Poland as a separate political entity among other Kremlin-dependent states in Eastern Europe. This policy, introduced by the Dwight D. Eisenhower administration, was continued by his successors John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson.

Recently declassified US and Polish archival sources allow the presentation of more considerations around the decision-making mechanisms by presidential administrations regarding communist Poland after 1956. They also reveal the dependence of the implementation of US actions on the climate of international relations. Moreover, they can now explain how Poland became an “open window” toward the Soviet bloc and a model example of the changes in the US policy of diversifying its approach to Eastern European countries under Soviet control in the next decades.

chapter |11 pages

Introduction

part I|94 pages

An Open Window in the Iron Curtain

chapter 1|20 pages

The United States and Polish October

chapter 2|20 pages

The Swan Song of the Liberation

chapter 3|6 pages

First PL 480 Agreement

chapter 4|18 pages

Activities at the Political Level

chapter 5|8 pages

Activities at the Economic Level

chapter 6|8 pages

Public Diplomacy

Cultural and Scientific Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid

part II|94 pages

“Don't Shut the Door”

chapter 8|18 pages

New Hopes and First Disappointments

chapter 10|8 pages

Other Fields of Cooperation

chapter 11|11 pages

The Laborious “Bridge Building”

chapter 13|10 pages

RFE and Other Propaganda Efforts

part III|28 pages

The Dilemma of Oder-Neisse Border

chapter |4 pages

Conclusion