ABSTRACT
This book provides the historical and political context for the security interventions in Mali over the past three decades.
The work contextualizes external military engagement (including that of the United States, France, the United Nations and G5 Sahel) within the broader framework of weak democratic consolidation, unmet development goals and increasing popular perceptions of widespread corruption in Mali. Over the past three decades, there have been four military coups in Mali: the military coup in 1991 launched the Third Republic; the 2012 coup toppled elected President Touré; the 2020 coup overthrew the elected President Keita; and the coup within a coup that ousted transitional President Bah. Given the political context, how do multiple international interventions relate to insecurity and instability in the country? Drawing on the author’s thirty years of research on Mali, this work examines the relationship between external intervention in the country, domestic actors, and decentralization policies. The book argues that external support has ignored the poor governance that is at the heart of the country’s crises.
This book will be of much interest to students of intervention and statebuilding, African politics and International Relations in general.
