ABSTRACT

D. M. Armstrong's A Materialist Theory of the Mind is widely known as one of the most important defences of the view that mental states are nothing but physical states of the brain. A landmark of twentieth-century philosophy of mind, it launched the physicalist revolution in approaches to the mind and has been engaged with, debated and puzzled over ever since its first publication over fifty years ago.

Ranging over a remarkable number of topics, from behaviourism, the will and knowledge to perception, bodily sensation and introspection, Armstrong argues that mental states play a causally intermediate role between stimuli, other mental states and behavioural responses. He uses several illuminating examples to illustrate this, such as the classic case of pain.

This Routledge Classics edition includes a new Foreword by Peter Anstey, placing Armstrong's book in helpful philosophical and historical context.

chapter |3 pages

Introduction

part 1|133 pages

Theories of Mind

chapter 1|11 pages

A Classification of Theories of Mind

chapter 2|23 pages

Dualism

chapter 3|13 pages

The Attribute Theory

chapter 5|21 pages

Behaviourism

chapter 6|57 pages

The Central-State Theory

part 2|238 pages

The Concept of Mind

chapter 7|45 pages

The Will (1)

chapter 8|17 pages

The Will (2)

chapter 9|22 pages

Knowledge and Inference

chapter 10|39 pages

Perception and Belief

chapter 11|27 pages

Perception and Behaviour

chapter 12|22 pages

The Secondary Qualities

chapter 13|16 pages

Mental Images

chapter 14|18 pages

Bodily Sensations

chapter 15|17 pages

Introspection

chapter 16|13 pages

Belief and Thought

part 3|15 pages

The Nature of Mind