ABSTRACT
Scholars and policymakers alike agree on the critical importance of providing security in post-conflict environments. Without security, the essential political, social, and economic tasks of statebuilding cannot be accomplished, yet in the wake of conflict, the local institutions necessary to provide this security are often lacking. Thus, foreign powers-either multilaterally under a United Nations mandate or individually-deploy their military forces to fill this void. This chapter examines the role of these foreign military forces in the process of post-conflict reconstruction and long-term, sustainable statebuilding. It asks under what conditions foreign military intervention is most likely to be an effective tool in the process of statebuilding. Most of the chapter is devoted to examining two fundamental dilemmas
that confront both the population of a state rebuilding in the wake of conflict and the foreign powers participating in that reconstruction. The first dilemma is the duration dilemma. Military forces may play an essential role in providing security, but the “welcome” afforded to those forces is likely to obsolesce over time as populations seek to regain full sovereign control over their territory. Facing this dilemma, military forces may face strong pressures to withdraw before indigenous security institutions have been fully established, or else they must be prepared to endure increasing resistance and resentment at their continuing presence. The second dilemma is the footprint dilemma. Intervention forces vary
both in the size of the presence and their degree of intrusiveness. A larger footprint may be better at fostering security, but may also introduce the risk of stimulating nationalist resistance against the foreign presence. A smaller footprint minimizes the risk of nationalist resistance but may also make it more difficult to sustain a secure and stable environment. Similarly, a less intrusive footprint may avoid alienating the population, but a more intrusive footprint may be better able to establish control over a divided and conflict-ridden society. Establishing the appropriate footprint-neither too large nor too small, neither too intrusive nor too passive-represents a significant challenge to military interveners. Not all statebuilding military interventions suffer these dilemmas equally.
After presenting the dilemmas, I consider what factors might make statebuilding
military interventions either more or less susceptible to these dilemmas. I first differentiate between two different types of statebuilding interventions: military occupations and complex peacekeeping. Not surprisingly, unilateral military occupation forces that assume control through conquest are likely to see their welcome obsolesce more quickly and should expect more pronounced resistance to a large footprint. Conversely, UN-authorized forces that intervene with the consent of the population are welcome for longer and are generally able to sustain a more intrusive presence. In addition to the type of intervention, the “threat environment” of the
territory in question significantly affects the severity of the dilemmas. The logic of this argument is simple: to avoid either the duration dilemma or the footprint dilemma, foreign intervention forces must be viewed by the population as less of a threat than some other potential threat. After all, intervention forces are, in principle, deployed to provide security and protection. When a significant element within the population views the intervention forces themselves as the most immediate threat to its security and prospects for selfdetermination, then both the duration dilemma and the footprint dilemma are likely to be most acute. Even consensual multilateral interventions are likely to see their welcome obsolesce and their presence resented in an unpropitious threat environment. Ultimately, though, the lesson of this chapter is that military force can aid
in the process of statebuilding, but it cannot substitute for the political solution that is necessary for statebuilding to be successful. Put differently, military intervention may be necessary in some cases to build a stable, sustainable state, but it is usually not sufficient. The Kosovo case discussed below and in Jens Narten’s chapter in this volume demonstrates how populations may value the protection offered by a military force while rejecting the abrogation of sovereignty by a UN administration. The pressures of the duration and footprint dilemmas are likely to persist as long as a political solution is absent. Only when a political solution is realized can the dilemmas of statebuilding military intervention be fully alleviated. I conclude with policy recommendations for future statebuilding interven-
tions. Certain factors may alleviate the duration and footprint dilemmas, but no statebuilding military intervention is completely immune from these dilemmas. Leaders contemplating the use of their military forces for statebuilding missions abroad must prepare to deal with these dilemmas, not deny their existence. At the end of the chapter, I also examine the geopolitics of military intervention for statebuilding purposes in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001.
