ABSTRACT
Our previous case studies dealt with co-operative arrangements in which a complete project or set of projects was planned by a nongovernmental unit under federal license. In the case of Hells Canyon, it became apparent that problems of indivisibility and direct interdependence impede efficient development as a private venture in the absence of extra-market incentives. For the Coosa River, where the circumstances are significantly different, there appears to be a much more promising prospect for efficient, development under private auspices. There, complete hydraulic integration under unified management is possible, and the relatively modest contributions to power output from the river system can be readily absorbed into the developer's electrical system. But even in the case of the Coosa, there remain some problems of providing the project services which do not produce revenue. Although the legislation enabling the Federal Power Commission to license Alabama Power Company for developing the Coosa required provision of a specified amount of nonmarketable project services, some difficulties are encountered in the distribution of the costs and gains; and there is a question of propriety in the method advanced to solve that problem.
