ABSTRACT
The Bombardment was all the more terrifying because it was clearly a “softening up” in preparation for a ground offensive. In Washington, Navy intelligence had decoded messages showing a prospective attack by the 2nd (Sendai) Division, with plans for Lt.-Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, who had taken command following Kawaguchi’s failure, to bring his 17th Army headquarters down from Rabaul. A light cruiser and eleven destroyers had sailed south, and at first light on 15 October Marines could see six transports unloading thousands of Japanese soldiers up the beach beyond the mouth of the Matanikau. US carrier-based planes were called in, although 1,100 men reached shore and melted into the interior, several thousand more landing later that day. Soon Japanese troops on the island would total 22,200.1
Vandegrift, prone neither to panic nor overstatement, now flatly told Nimitz:
Our troops are in no condition to undertake the prolonged campaigning needed to secure the island. Steps must be taken to gain control of the seas around Guadalcanal to prevent enemy landings and the bombardments we have experienced in the last three nights.
