ABSTRACT
Indonesia’s neighborhood associations, called rukun tetangga and rukun warga (RT/RW), had important functions under the authoritarian New Order (1966-1998), which saw political stability as a top priority.1 The lowest-level organizational unit, the RT, served as a government tool to control people by keeping all citizens under close supervision by the RT head. This individual kept careful tabs on anyone moving into or out of the neighborhood, pressured the residents to be good citizens, and harassed those who were not in line with the government. He or she also mobilized citizens at the grassroots politically and ideologically, on the occasion of national elections in particular. Regularly organized meetings served as conduits for messages from the authorities, which contained not just ordinary information but also many forms of indoctrination and teaching. The RT/RW originated as tonarigumi during the Japanese occupation period (1942-1945), and existed prior to 1966 in Java as a more autonomous form of community organization, before Suharto reorganized it into a uniform nationwide institution by putting it under government supervision. Though the RT/RW was an institution imposed from above, the state also strove to give it a democratic flavor. With members allowed to elect leaders, organize meetings, and discuss many things by themselves, these organizations served to give people the illusion that they were participating in bottom-up decision-making. Along with other pseudo-democratic processes like voting regularly in national elections, this meant that people other than active dissenters – especially the less-educated – often had little sense of being suppressed. The system formed part of the way that the oppressive Suharto government could evade strong popular opposition for 32 years. In spite of its pronounced state-sponsored character, the RT/RW survived the collapse of the Suharto regime in May 1998 and the restoration of democracy. Evidence from my research site in Java shows that little has changed, at least outwardly, in its function and the form of its activities. This continuity suggests the possibility that RT/RW actually had more meaning than was originally intended by the government. Residents, it appears, made positive use of it for such things as improving their daily lives, providing social security and welfare, and protecting themselves from outside forces. It offered mechanisms to realize rapid economic and social development, but at the same time it might have served as a shock
absorber, buffering against changes caused by rapid economic development and globalization. A group of Japanese academics who study urban community organization in developing countries divide such organizations into two categories (Hataya 1999). One, which they call “life strategy oriented,” started as informal mutual aid organizations among the poor, providing them with welfare and aid that government failed to supply. This type of organization is perceived as helping residents improve their lives and providing a social safety net. The other, called “development strategy oriented,” was set up with intervention from “above” to implement development projects. Of course these two types cannot be separated completely. In many cases the latter were created as the extension or transformation of the former by government intervention. Also, there are very few of the former organizations that can maintain complete independence from the hand of government. Examining the Indonesian RT/RW in this framework, my hypothesis is that the former type of organization, which had prevailed prior to 1966, was converted into the latter type by the Suharto regime and used for social-economic development and political stability. After the fall of Suharto it gradually shifted back to the former type, but in many aspects it remained unchanged. Its survival to the present may be partly interpreted as showing that ordinary people have reasons for wanting it maintained. Perhaps the RT/RW in New Order Indonesia was not merely an imposition by the authorities, but reflected certain cultural values of indigenous society and basic aspirations of the people. In post-Suharto days, although RT/RW have kept many characteristics from the authoritarian period, people are trying to make positive use of this institution for their own purposes in an era of economic crisis and political change. The new government succeeding Suharto considered the RT/RW to be convenient for its own purposes, and this is also a reason why this social institution has been kept. This kind of institution is useful for any type of government as a means of effectively monitoring and administering the population at the grassroots. Under such circumstances, RT/RW leaders are forced to cope with new duties and new kinds of problems, and have had to adjust themselves to new situations. They cannot enjoy the same kind of power as they had before, because their constituents, who are getting more and more sophisticated with regard to the ways of democracy, now tend to be cautious and suspicious of what they do. Therefore people’s attitudes toward RT/RW are sometimes ambivalent. It can be said that RT/RW are swaying between state and community. After examining how the RT/RW system functioned in general as a means of control and mobilization under the authoritarian regime, I will discuss how it did and did not change after the collapse of this regime. To get a handle on this question I will focus on the regular meetings held by the RT and analyze their form, function, and the extent of members’ participation. Through this I will try to discern the character of the post-Suharto RT system and how ordinary people perceive its function and importance. As I explain, this chapter is based on data I have gathered since 1998 while living with my family in an RT in a lower-income residential area of Jakarta’s suburbs and participating in its activities.
