ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the total outcome of the British patterns of civil-military relations, as seen in the context of the war in Iraq from 2003, or what the British call ‘Operation Telic’. The analysis, thereby, functions as an empirical test of the hypothesis in relation to the British case, and also adds some insights to the literature on British operations in Iraq, mainly by adding the civil-military perspective to the analysis. The empirical test involves tracing the causal chain to the dependent variable of operational conduct in complex peace operations and includes both the direct and indirect effects of civil-military relations. The chapter, therefore, does not provide a comprehensive analysis of British operations in Iraq, but instead focuses on three thematic discussions that are relevant to the hypothesis of this book. They involve the British approach to operations in Iraq, the level of civil-military co-operation and co-ordination, and the tactical conduct of operations. The first thematic discussion seeks to answer how the operation was interpreted and conceptualized by the military and civilian leadership in the UK, as well as how this was translated into political aims and operational plans. The discussion of civil-military co-operation and co-ordination involves two sub-categories in the civil-military aspects of the planning process and of the command and control structures. Finally, the discussion on tactical behaviour studies the conduct of tactical operations with reference to the hearts and minds approach, minimum use of force, cultural understanding and adaptability. The main research questions for the chapter are: how have the patterns of civil-military relations affected post-conflict planning, and how have they functioned as a link in the chain of command? To what extent is the British way of war reflected in their operations in Iraq?
