Introduction: Effectiveness in complex peace operations

The conclusion of The Iraq Study Group Report was published almost four years after the invasion of Iraq. Despite the enormous efforts by the US and her main coalition partner, the UK, at that time, the campaign in Iraq had constituted nothing less than a failure. Since then, the situation has clearly improved, but despite military successes during the surge of 2007 that stabilized Iraq to an extent not seen since the invasion in 2003, the political breakthroughs and reconciliation processes that were the aims of the surge have not been realized. Successes at the tactical level are not translated into the strategic aims. The campaign in Iraq is by no means an exception. The post-Cold War era has presented the world’s remaining great powers with a large number of internal and regional conflicts, failing states, massive human rights violations and global terrorism. The results of the responses to these challenges have been mixed at best, and it is clear that the failures in Somalia and Rwanda have made the more powerful and lasting impressions. In the new millennium, the trend towards interventions in complex emergencies has continued, and the security environment of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 context makes complex peace operations, as currently witnessed in Afghanistan and Iraq, the most likely and the most important military tasks. Therefore, understanding why the intervening powers have failed to achieve the strategic aims in these types of operations is of great importance. This book makes a significant contribution in this quest by introducing the variable of civil-military relations to explain operational effectiveness. While a large number of factors can be mustered to explain the conduct and effectiveness of armed forces in military operations – the political nature of the state, strategic doctrine, military culture and history, the nature of the enemy, geography, training and equipment – this book studies the effect of the often

overlooked factor of civil-military relations. Importantly, the patterns of civilmilitary relations in a state, although not the most obvious causal variable when explaining operational conduct, are more or less related to the majority of the factors mentioned above. Operating at an overarching level in the causal chain, this single variable, therefore, has the potential to relate and co-ordinate a large number of factors into a more comprehensive narrative, explaining effectiveness in complex operations. Thus, understanding the patterns of civil-military relations in states significantly helps increase the understanding of what causes military organizations to operate the way they do. Coupled with the nature of the contemporary strategic context, as well as strategic and tactical lessons learned from different forms of complex peace operations, the civil-military variable also helps explain the reasons why seemingly superior Western military organizations have struggled and even lost against guerrilla type asymmetric opponents. The aim of this book is, therefore, to increase the understanding of the civilmilitary dimension of operational conduct and effectiveness in the context of complex peace operations. How do the patterns of civil-military relations affect the conduct and effectiveness of operations in the context of complex peace operations, and how can civil-military structures be improved for increased effectiveness during operations? The principal argument of the book is that the nature of civil-military relations within a particular state has an important impact on the effectiveness of its armed forces within the contemporary strategic context of complex and irregular peace operations. More specifically, an integrated approach to civil-military relations that provides an extensive interagency system as well as integrated civil-military structures within the ministry of defence, is more likely to produce armed forces that are ‘fit for purpose’, and, consequently, effective during operations. There are two main reasons why integrated civil-military structures at the strategic level provide better results in complex peace operations. First, integrated structures provide more accurate and up-to-date interpretations and adjustment to the functional imperative of the armed forces. This means that the instruments of national power, not least the military, are better suited to deal with the particular challenges of the contemporary strategic context. Second, integrated structures provide more inclusive command and control structures at the strategic level of the operational chain of command, which means that all relevant actors in complex operations are co-ordinated through integrated assessment, planning and execution of operations – providing what is often referred to as a comprehensive approach to operations. The policy implications are significant as they contradict the bureaucratic cultures of departmental stove-piping that are prevalent in most political systems. The multitude of tasks and the complexity of the political aims in contemporary peace operations mean that the different instruments of national power must be involved and co-ordinated during strategic assessment and planning for effective conduct in operations. This requires well-functioning interagency structures and a co-operative working culture of trust and mutual understanding. It also requires

extensive civil-military integration within the defence ministries for multifunctional planning with the political objectives in mind. In short, multifunctional operations require integrated multifunctional bureaucracies – something that contradicts the traditional policy advice to separate political and military leaders and thereby achieve purity of both political and military affairs for maximized military effectiveness. The implications for theory are equally significant. Strategic theory and analysis of military effectiveness must include the civil-military dimension as it is an essential variable. It can even be asked as to what extent it is relevant to speak of military operational effectiveness, or ‘fighting power’, in a context where operations are inherently multidimensional, involving diplomatic, military and economic aspects. A comprehensive view of operational effectiveness is more useful and the question should be whether a country’s entire security apparatus is ‘fit for purpose’ and effective. The field of civil-military relations must also be expanded to include what this book calls the direct impact on effectiveness – the impact of the civil-military interface as an important level in the chain of command during operations. Another implication is that the normative Huntingtonian argument regarding the benefits of objective civilian control through a divide between the military and civilian leaderships is once more refuted. The number of studies on civil-military relations in different countries, especially the US, is vast. Despite theoretical problems and limited applicability in the contemporary strategic context, the most important contributions to this literature remain Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State (1957) and Morris Janowitz’s The Professional Soldier (1960). More recently, we should add Peter Feaver’s important work Armed Servants (2003) to that list. Of course, the studies of military effectiveness in terms of strategy and operational conduct in Iraq from 2003 and other complex operations, such as Vietnam, Malaya, Kosovo and Bosnia, are equally plentiful. The contribution of this book lies in the marriage of these two fields of enquiry. By explaining effectiveness and operational conduct using the patterns of civil-military relations as the explanatory variable, this book increases the understanding of both fields. The field of civil-military relations has a weakness in the analytical overemphasis on civilian democratic control at the expense of military effectiveness (Nielsen 2005; Strachan 2006). Moreover, the impact of different patterns of civil-military relations during operations has not been explored. This is a serious gap in the literature on civilmilitary relations as well as in the field of strategic studies. Until important recent studies that have sought to explain why the seemingly more powerful actors sometimes lose against weaker enemies, the literature on strategy and military effectiveness has traditionally overemphasized the military and physical factors (Biddle 2004; Brooks 2003). This book develops a new theoretical framework for analysis of how civilmilitary relations affect the conduct of operations in complex peace operations. In short, this framework argues that the organization of the civil-military interface affects the conduct of operations in two important ways: directly, by providing the highest levels in the chain of command – the level where strategic

aims are set and operational plans made, and indirectly by being the arena in which decisions regarding size, culture, equipment and doctrine of the armed forces are made. In short the indirect impact influences the quality of the tools available to the political leadership for operations, while the direct impact determines the effectiveness with which these tools are employed. Without properly functioning civil-military relations, structurally as well as culturally, effectiveness in complex peace operations is, therefore, unlikely. This framework is tested and refined in the book through the method of process tracing (George and Bennett 2004). Beyond the general discussion regarding causality, the empirical analyses seek to explain how specific patterns of civil-military relations affect operational conduct and effectiveness. To achieve that, the main section of the book involves the analyses of two cases: the United States and the United Kingdom. Each case involves the analyses of the patterns of civil-military relations, the strategic culture or the ‘way of war’, as well as the conduct and effectiveness of operations in Iraq from 2003. The case studies thereby involve two distinct patterns of civil-military relations. First, a divided approach is exemplified by the US case and involves limited interagency co-operation, a divided civil-military interface and military ownership of the functional imperative. Second, the integrated approach is exemplified by the British case, which involves relatively extensive interagency co-operation and civil-military integration within the Ministry of Defence, as well as civilian ownership of the functional imperative of the armed forces. The two cases are initially analysed separately, but in order to highlight the findings of the case studies, and to evaluate the assumptions of the theoretical framework, the book also includes a comparative analysis which compares and contrasts the findings of the case studies. As mentioned, the analyses of the case studies show that the US is a clear example of the divided approach to civil-military relations, involving limited interagency co-operation, and a divided civil-military interface within the Department of Defense. Importantly, the functional imperative of the armed forces has always been defined by the military itself, which has meant limited political influence regarding the structure and culture of the military establishment. It has developed a rigid military culture and structure that is not well adjusted to face the challenges of the contemporary strategic context – complex peace operations. Reflecting the civil-military structures, the US system has always advocated purity of military and political advice to decision makers. The flaws of the US civil-military interface became obvious in Iraq as the operational plans failed to use the interagency apparatus and to co-ordinate the operational planning for all relevant actors – military and civilian. The US military culture, focused on conventional warfare, failed as it misinterpreted the operation at the strategic level in the planning process, and as the units in the field of operations were untrained, unprepared and unequipped for the more important post-conflict tasks. The British case, although not as clear cut, is an example of the integrated approach to civil-military relations. It involves relatively extensive interagency

co-operation and excellent civil-military integration within the Ministry of Defence. In the UK, the political leadership has always defined the functional imperative of the armed forces, and thereby, to a larger extent than in the US case, influenced the structure and culture of its armed forces. In contrast with the US case, the British system emphasizes integrated political and military advice and joint civil-military deliberation of issues before briefing the policy makers. British forces are, therefore, on the one hand flexible and adjustable to the political imperatives of the day, and, as a consequence, relatively well in synch with the demands of contemporary irregular warfare. On the other hand, the British armed forces are severely under-funded and undersized in relation to the tasks that the political leadership asks of them. In Iraq, Tony Blair circumscribed the traditional system of interagency committees which meant that the UK shared many of the strategic level planning mistakes with its coalition partner. In the field, British troops showed a familiar flexibility in adjusting to different situations and levels of threat. The inability to maintain enough troops in Iraq over time proved crucial in the failure to establish a safe environment in southern Iraq. The study of American and British operational conduct in complex peace operations is intrinsically interesting as the two countries, for different reasons, are likely to participate in, and lead such operations in the future. The US has a particular role as the sole remaining military superpower and will in that role, as well as to protect its own interests and security, continue to be engaged in complex peace operations. The UK has a unique experience and capability of complex operations, including counter-insurgency. That experience, in combination with a large international presence, makes them likely to continue to engage in and lead operations of that kind, not least within the EU and/or NATO frameworks. The design of the study, involving two cases and a comparative analysis, has created the possibility to contrast and compare different structures and methods of command and their effectiveness in contexts that have important similarities and differences. Again, the US and the UK are of great interest. Despite many relative similarities in culture and background, including extensive experience in both conventional large-scale warfare and counter-insurgency operations, the two countries operate very differently. They also have very different patterns of civil-military relations. Essentially, the cases were chosen based on their relevance to the theory of the book. They contain similarities and contrasts that make them helpful in understanding the causal relationship of the book (Denscombe 1998: 33). The coalition’s operations in Iraq have been chosen as the empirical testing ground of the book because it represents the latest and most interesting example of major powers conducting complex peace operations involving an asymmetric opponent. It also represents the complex far-reaching political aims often sought in contemporary operations, as well as the characteristics of a truly modern insurgency. Although a number of historical counter-insurgency campaigns are interesting in terms of reference for this book, they would not have provided the

same contextual accuracy concerning contemporary irregular warfare. The case of Iraq also allows for a comparative analysis of US and British operational conduct within the same context, allowing for a number of different contextual variables to be isolated. It should, nevertheless, be emphasized from the beginning that, although US and British troops were, and are, operating within Iraq at the same time, the two armed forces actually operated within very different contexts. The Shia-dominated South where the British troops have operated is generally considered easier and less violent than the Sunni-dominated areas of the country where US troops are mainly operating. This problematic aspect of the empirical study is obviously further discussed in each of the case studies, as well as in the comparative Chapter 9.