ABSTRACT
The central theme of this book was the complex phenomenon of de-radicalization of armed Islamist movements. The research analyzed three types of deradicalization processes (comprehensive, substantive and pragmatic) in Egypt and Algeria since the 1950s. These processes of abandoning political violence, prohibiting it ideologically and theologically, and/or dismantling armed wings started in 1951 with an attempt by the Egyptian MB leadership to dissolve their Special Apparatus. That first attempt failed, as did the next one; but the third attempt, between 1969 and 1973, was successful. Moreover the surge in the number of armed Islamist groups between the 1980s and the 2000s meant that contemporary cases of de-radicalization were suddenly being given significantly more attention, a trend that accelerated after the 11 September 2001 attacks. The case of the Egyptian IG became a de-radicalization model in which the leadership was able to control the followers and de-radicalize the Group on the behavioral, ideological and organizational levels. Three months after the IG’s declaration of the unilateral ceasefire which started the process, the Algerian AIS also declared a unilateral ceasefire. That declaration started another deradicalization process, this time in Algeria. Although that process lacked an ideological component (and hence has been labelled pragmatic de-radicalization in this book), it was able to attract several Islamist militias, as well as factions from armed groups whose leadership had refused to de-radicalize (like the GIA and the GSPC). A decade later, al-Jihad of Egypt, the organization that both had and still has the strongest ties with al-Qa‘ida network, followed the IG’s lead. Also, many other armed groups and factions initiated de-radicalization processes in the 2000s. These groups and factions come from various parts of Muslim-majority countries including Libya, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Tajikistan, Malaysia and Indonesia. The central hypothesis in this book is about the causes that might lead to such a process of de-radicalization, as well as the necessary conditions for its success. The argument made was that a combination of charismatic leadership in control of its followers, state repression directed against the armed movement, selective inducements proffered by state and other actors, and social interaction between the layers of the movement as well as between the movement and the “other” are
the four variables that could explain the initiation and success of deradicalization processes. The pattern of interaction between these variables is as follows: state repression and interaction with the “other” affects the ideas and the behaviors of the leadership of a radical organization. After updating its beliefs and worldviews, calculating the costs and the benefits and reassessing security dilemmas, the leadership initiates a de-radicalization process that is bolstered by selective inducements from the state, as well as by internal interactions (such as lectures, discussions, meetings between the leadership, mid-ranking commanders and grassroots in an effort to convince them to support deradicalization).
