ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the causes of de-radicalization among Algerian armed Islamist movements. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Algeria provides two cases of de-radicalization, one of which was successful while the other was a failure. The successful case was that of the Islamic Salvation Army (AIS), the self-declared armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). This process of deradicalization took place between 1993 and 2000. The leadership of that organization was not only able to dismantle the AIS, but was also able to influence smaller armed organizations and factions to join the de-radicalization process. The AIS and its affiliates were also able to reintegrate into the Algerian civilian society. Currently, the leaders of that organization attempt to re-enter the political process peacefully through establishing a political party (Mezraq 2007, 1). By contrast, the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) is a case that has seen mixed results. Whereas some of its affiliated militias joined the AIS-led process, the bulk of the group failed to de-radicalize. Instead, part of the GIA was completely destroyed by 2005. Another part broke away as early as 1998 and renamed itself in 1999 the Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). By 2007, a part of the GSPC was still negotiating laying down its arms and abandoning violence (behavioral de-radicalization), but the largest faction underwent even further radicalization by internationalizing their cause and allying with al-Qa‘ida network. That splinter of the GSPC called itself al-Qa‘ida in the Islamic Countries of al-Maghreb (QICM). The AIS and the GIA started their armed action in the very same crisis environment that plagued Algeria after the 1992 coup. The two organizations however, ended up in very different positions. This chapter attempts to account for the discrepancy in the behavior of both organizations and to answer the question of why the AIS-led de-radicalization process was successful whereas the GIA failed to de-radicalize, despite being in the same context and subjected to
similar influences. The argument in this chapter rests on the empirical fact that both organizations were subjected to intense state repression and were offered several types of selective inducements. However, the AIS had a consolidated, charismatic leadership that was willing to de-radicalize. That leadership was influential enough to disarm the 7,000 militants that made up the organization, without causing any splits, as well as influencing several hundreds militants from other smaller militias and factions. The GIA did not have this type of leadership at any point in its history (1992-2005). Additionally, the AIS was able to interact with other armed organizations, FIS factions, moderate Islamist figures and political parties to support de-radicalization and reconciliation. The GIA had very limited interactions with the “other,” mainly due to its excessively violent behavior. The violence of the GIA was not only directed against the “other” but also against GIA figures and factions who were supportive of interaction.
