ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) has relied heavily on the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) in tackling its labour market and social problems. The OMC leads us to question and expand current explanations about when, how, why and to what degree the EU affects Member States, insofar as this method is grounded in an alternative set of assumptions about how and why this supranational entity may influence domestic structures. Given the accelerating development of such non-binding rules internationally and our limited understanding of them, this chapter summarizes a set of key research findings regarding the influence of the European Employment Strategy (EES) on Belgium, Spain, and Sweden.1 The propositions presented here serve as a basis for further testing in other Member States and other regimes (e.g. federal, supranational, international) governed by non-binding rules. Before presenting the results, the following section develops a theoretical
‘toolbox’ to help researchers analyse the differential effects of soft law (i.e. non-binding rules) on domestic settings. This discussion of internalization (the dependent variable) provides a framework for conceptualizing the influence of these instruments on various domestic structures. Subsequent sections focus mainly on the differential influence of the EES and its political internalization.
Scholars evaluating the effects of Europeanization and other transnational legal processes face multiple questions about how to capture, measure, interpret, and theorize implementation (see Zeitlin, Hamel and Vanhercke, this volume). The questions include: ‘What constitutes implementation? How do we recognize implementation when we see it? How can we establish to what degree regional and international mandates matter at the domestic level?’ These questions are particularly difficult to answer in the case of soft law, since implementation of non-binding rules does not mirror processes of compliance with hard law.2 Hence, it is important to recognize that answering the question ‘How are labour market policies (LMPs) and institutions being
affected by the EES at the domestic level?’ is as complicated as developing a solid model for understanding cross-national differences and patterns. Given these challenges, I argue that ‘soft Europeanization’ in the form of
the EES has a variety of consequences at the national level which can include (but are not limited to) policy (re)formulation, learning about desirable and potential policies (Visser, this volume), policy changes, and intra-governmental coordination.3 This approach moves away from the traditional category of compliance and focuses on process and internalization as it ‘opens and unpacks the black box of policymaking’ to capture various modes of transformations not necessarily linked to ratification and transposition (López-Santana 2006a). In this way, the effects of non-binding agreements such as the EES on domestic settings ought not to be conceptualized as a dichotomous (occurs/does not occur) dependent variable, but rather as a continuous variable ranging from ‘no influence’ to ‘transformation’ of domestic settings. Figure 6.1 illustrates this continuum. In these scenarios, one possible outcome is a lack of change (Radaelli 2003:
37). In other words, internalization does not occur; thus, soft law has no influence on Member States. Second, soft law could lead to partial internalization. This means that these non-binding rules are absorbed by domestic settings. In this context, internalization occurs and domestic settings make accommodations to these non-binding rules – policies and procedures change (not institutions), but key domestic institutional structures and political behaviour are not truly modified. For instance, as a consequence of supranational recommendations a Member State could spend more on active labour market policy (ALMP); still, this shift does not mean that the prevalent model of LMP and the role of the government as a provider have changed in this country. Finally, when full internalization occurs, domestic settings are transformed (Radaelli 2003). Transformation is different from accommodation in that it entails paradigmatic change – the fundamental logic of domestic structures is transformed. Along the lines of the aforementioned example, transformation in LMP entails a change in the role of the government in supporting inactive and unemployed populations, in addition to a change in how recipients of welfare are viewed by the government (as either passive recipients of aid or active seekers of employment). Up to this point, I have referred to the effect of the EES on ‘domestic
structures’; but what, exactly, are these domestic structures? To disentangle the questions posed in this book, it is useful to distinguish between policy, politics, and polity. The implementation process can simultaneously impact each of these.4 First, the EES can alter domestic policies by leading policy
makers to (re)consider and (re)frame their views and preferences. This, in turn, can lead to formal changes in the content of public policies and/or laws. Consequently, this process can spark civil, partisan and/or governmental deliberations (politics), since formal and informal policy changes (especially those tied to the welfare state and to Left/Right cleavages) tend to be contested. Finally, the process of implementing the EES can impact the polity (institutional structures) and governance structures by affecting or altering the relationships and balances of power among different types of domestic actors, including levels of government. In considering the internalization of soft law, we can further differentiate
between tangible and intangible effects on policies and politics. Furthermore, to specify the notion of polity, I differentiate between different types of actors and settings where change can take place. To do this, I borrow from the literature on international law and compliance the notions of political and legal internalization (Koh 1997).
