ABSTRACT
In this chapter, the long and winding road leading from Cotonou to the interim agreements, concluded in November and December 2007, between the European Union (EU) and some regions/countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) is described and analysed. The focus is on the negotiation dynamics defining the process. Two main research questions guide the investigation: What were the characteristic features of the negotiation processes? Why did the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) negotiations end up with EPA light interim agreements and not with full EPAs? Theoretically, themes from negotiation theory are introduced and applied, notably the distinction between conflictual and problem-solving negotiations (Hopmann 1996; Walton and McKersie 1991), the use of framing, signalling and bargaining tactics (Jervis 1970; Schelling 1960), the notion of crisis negotiations (Fearon 1998; Walsh 2007) and the impact of asymmetric power on outcomes (Zartman and Rubin 2000a). In order to reach satisfactory answers to the queries of this chapter, the bargaining process is divided into two different stages. Between the start of the negotiations in 2002 and 2005 nothing much happened. The Commission’s Directorate General for Trade (DG Trade), which was in charge of the negotiations on the EU side, tried half-heartedly to initiate a discussion on free trade agreements but reactions were slow and lukewarm at best. Why did it take so long before ‘real’ negotiations started? During 2006, negotiations slowly started to gain pace. But it was not until the spring of 2007, less than a year before the proclaimed deadline, that serious discussions started. Now, the negotiations took on the nature of ‘crisis negotiations’, characterized by a high tempo and tough bargaining. Why? My argument as to the first stage is that the ACP countries put limited priority on EPAs, being quite satisfied with the preferential treatment they received under the existing regime. At the same time, EU member states were initially not very interested in the EPA negotiations, leaving these in the hands of DG Trade. DG Trade’s framing of the process as a free trade negotiation complicated matters further. Development aspects – expected by the ACPs based on their Lomé-experiences – were not on the agenda for a long time. This increased the
resistance to real negotiations from the ACP side and eventually also led to concerns among the so-called like-minded EU member states, leading them to take a growing interest in the negotiations. The problem to get negotiations started was accentuated by a lack of organizational capacity on the part of ACP regions and states. The negotiations that did take place were more symbolic than real, with the parties talking past each other. My argument as to the second stage focuses on the deadline caused by the perceived (especially by the Commission) necessity of compatibility with the World Trade Organization (WTO) and on the strong motivation within DG Trade to have an agreement before the end of 2007. The Commission’s definition of the situation as (a) having an absolute dead-line, and (b) with no possible positive alternatives put a tremendous pressure on ACP non-least developed countries (non-LDC), and especially on their export sector interests. In the end, the EU offered some concessions, due both to member state and ACP criticism, both as regards development aspects and trade access. These carrots, combined with hard pressure from the Commission, led to real but very forced negotiations, which may be called ‘crisis negotiations’ as they involved perceptions of time pressure and high values at stake. Negotiations became confrontational, rather than problem-solving. The end result was that only limited interim agreements were concluded, and only with some regions/countries. While the asymmetric nature of the negotiations with pressure from the stronger party can explain why agreements were signed at all, the short time available, linked to some negotiation tactics used by the ACP countries, help us understand the nature of the outcome, including the inclusion of development aspects and the exclusion of the Singapore issues. My interpretation of the EPA negotiation process is based on documentary evidence and on interviews. I have used official material from EU web pages and web-based material from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Documents and comments found on the European Centre for Development Policy Management’s webpage and its Trade Negotiations Insights (www.acp-eu-trade. org/epa) have been especially helpful. A second main type of material is in-depth interviews with five Commission officials (from DG Trade and DG Development) and 11 officials from six member states, as well as with four ACP and four NGO representatives in Brussels, all carried out between June 2006 and September 2007.
