Introduction

The current state of debate on the integration of the European trade union movement stresses that differences and competition pressure hinder its development. Workers from different countries, especially the high and low standard countries, have been placed into interest conflicts and competitive relations due to outsourcing, global sourcing, contracting and subcontracting (Hoffmann 2002: 128; Hudson 1999: 57). The establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) prompted trade unions into competition and national strategies (Martin and Ross 2001a: 146). Competitive pressure is imposed on workers by the strategy of management in multinational companies to play off workers from different plants against each other (Galgóczi et al. 2005; Hancké 2000; Tuckman and Whittal 2002; Wills 2001). Domestic working standards are undermined within the construction sector with the help of foreign workers (Kahmann 2006). On the other hand, solidarity among European workers is not predicted in the discussion on the future of the integration of European labour. Inner cleavages based on different national interests are a dominant diagnosis in the debate on the future of the integration of European workers (Ebbinghaus and Visser 1996: 5; Koch-Baumgarten 1999; Martin and Ross 2001ab; Meardi 2002; Streeck 1998, 1999; Visser 1998). The different interests of workers from rich and poor countries and structures

of trade unionism have been indicated as hindering labour interest representation at the European level since the early stages (Streeck and Schmitter 1991: 139f.; Visser and Ebbinghaus 1994: 222; Marks and McAdam 1996; Turner 1996). Overcoming of this cleavage in interests is assumed to foster capacity for action at the EU level and the defence of labour standards and social policy (Dølvik 1997: 28; Ebbinghaus and Visser 1996: 1; Schulten 2004). Due to the Eastern enlargement in 2004, the cleavages are supposed to become even deeper (Meardi 2002) and the enlarged market poses new challenges for the trade unions (Kvist 2004; Marginson and Taxler 2005; Vaughan-Whitehead 2003; Visser and Ebbinghaus 1994: 207). Therefore, the new member states should also be included in the scope of analysis. I would like to re-examine the ‘divide’ within European trade unionism that is assumed by other scholars. Whereas the scholars who concentrate on labour and trade unions point to

a cleavage and lack of interest in action at the European level, a study coming

from the tradition of social movement research presents a strikingly different picture. As an overview of the events based on online sources indicates (Gajewska 2008b: 111, Tab. 1), the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) mobilized tens of thousands of trade unionists in different places to call for European workers’ rights each year between 2000 and 2006. This contradiction should be a starting point in re-considering previous research and assumptions that conclude a lack of solidarity within the European trade union movement. Although contributions in the field of cooperation have until now stressed a

lack of solidarity this is not the only scenario imaginable. Alternative arguments can be derived, both from theories on market integration as well as from empirical examples – as my case studies will illustrate. Most approaches analyzing the prospects and practice of European labour integration stress the institutional differences and political economic factors that hinder cooperation. They are right in their findings: the structural conditions inevitably play a role in trade union cooperation. However, the same structural factor – namely market integration – is predicted either to lead workers towards competition (Streeck 1999), or to bring about a strengthening of union ties1 (Burgoon and Jacoby 2004: 854 summarize the argument of Cox 1972). Lloyd Ulman (1975) argues that market processes such as integration, increased capital mobility and the competitive pressure imposed on labour impel trade unions to bargain across broader geographical scope (summarized by Ebbinghaus and Visser 1996: 8). The latter scenario can also be derived from Polányi’s (1957[1944]) concept of double movement. The work of Polányi is an encompassing theory of the relation between market expansion and society. It conceptualizes both market formation as well as the societal reaction to it. Although it refers to the formation of national markets, I see a possible theoretical contribution in applying his concepts to regional transnational market integration. Consistent with this theory, I also predict cooperation as a reaction to market integration. This argument contrasts with the majority of conceptualizations on the topic. One should re-consider the arguments against transnational solidarity pre-

sented in prior contributions. The existing literature points to contradicting interests that hinder cooperation, especially between rich and poor countries. Other obstacles are divergent institutional legacies and path-dependencies, which have an impact on identities and preferences. Furthermore, a vertical divide within the trade unions is assumed: the lower levels of trade union structure being less internationally oriented than the top leadership and the European trade union organizations. This is supposed to inhibit a truly international engagement. The positive examples of transnational solidarity I analyze in this book reflect

the differences among the trade unions. However, they do not confirm the assumption that differences necessarily preclude cooperation and solidarity. The example of mobilization against the Service Directive in 2006, where the Eastern and Western trade unions were presumed to have different interests, shows that the interests cannot be derived from calculus on economic competitiveness

(first case). The example of cooperation among plants’ representatives illustrates that although the plants might engage in competition, workers’ representatives can change their strategy over time and start to cooperate (fourth case). A conflict over exploited Latvian workers in Sweden, referred to below as the Laval case, revealed that the institutional framework influences the preferences in transnational cooperation but also that the actors learn to establish new ways and informal institutions in transnational cooperation (third case). The history of conflict between German and Polish trade unions also shows that the relations can change and that the lower level of trade union structures can actually be more internationalist than its leadership (second case). I consider my examples to be critical cases and will argue that they reveal tendencies that will spread. Contrary to the usual assumptions, trade unions – despite their differences –

are sometimes ready to cooperate and mobilize. I would like to explore this option and find out what the bases of solidarity are in the transnational context and competition. As solidarity might not necessarily be derived from the interests based on the institutional and economic factors according to political economy and institutional approaches (Streeck 1999; Visser and Ebbinghaus 1994), I see a need for undertaking an explorative analysis of the interests and motivations in cases where workers actually decide to cooperate. I will investigate the conditions under which trade unions and workers formulate their interests in non-national/regional terms and analyze character, limits and potentials of solidarity. Consistent with this aim, I will focus also on the relations between represented and representatives in the vertical dimension of the trade union movement to assess its impact on transnational solidarity. The discrepancy between the theories and practice of transnational cooperation brings me to formulate the following research questions that will be addressed by this study:

1 Considering the assumption of other scholars that the trade unions from different countries have contradicting interests and that this precludes cooperation, one should ask whether the trade unions do indeed have different interests, or, if this should be true, under what conditions their interests change or coalesce. Another question is whether the differing interests really do hinder cooperation.