ABSTRACT
There is indeed a symmetry, as identified by Hornqvist (2004), between the erosion of civil liberties and the rule of law in the context of terrorism, and the same process at the opposite end of the scale of seriousness, involving control of disorderly and antisocial conduct. In the early twenty-first century Britain displays the syndrome to an unprecedented degree. The Economist (5 February 2005), in a leading article entitled ‘Taking Britain's liberties’, noted that ‘[t]he state has given itself new powers to deal with minor offences and other crimes which are scarcely less draconian than those to deal with suspected terrorism’. At least there was a public outcry and strong political resistance to the Home Secretary's intention to use executive powers to impose house arrest and other significant restrictions on terrorist suspects. There was little protest when a 13-year-old boy was subject to similar restrictions following his admittedly insupportable behaviour in his neighbourhood. In this case a court was involved, but acting in a civil capacity as it always does in such cases. The procedure has become so commonplace, and so similar to other adaptations of civil law to suit the purposes of crime control, that objections do not make headlines. ‘Precautionary injustice’ (Squires and Stephen 2005: 206) is taken for granted. The government knows that clamping down on neighbourhood pests is always popular and critics who raise principled objections are cast as enemies of community well-being. This is a pity, because it has been important, and overdue, to recognise the more painful effects of the erosion of the quality of life in neighbourhoods and public space that have borne the brunt of civil and economic decay. Labour politicians have been one conduit for channelling this awareness into policy-making circles. There had to be a response, but the form it has taken, and especially the accompanying rhetoric, has relied upon blame, enforcement and exclusion, as well as dubious adaptations of the law.
