ABSTRACT
The first decade of the existence of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) has undoubtedly been one of the most turbulent periods in Hong Kong’s recent history. According to the Basic Law (People’s Republic of China 1992), Hong Kong’s mini-constitution, the SAR shall be governed under the principle of “one country, two systems.” Under this arrangement, the socialist system and policies of mainland China will not be practiced in Hong Kong, and Hong Kong’s pre-handover capitalist system and way of life are to remain unchanged for fifty years.1 The Basic Law also promises a high degree of autonomy to the SAR and gradual and orderly progress toward full democracy.2 However, despite these promises, the anti-communist mentality of Hong Kong people and their long-held mistrust of Beijing naturally meant that, initially, they lacked confidence in Beijing’s policy of “one country, two systems” (Lau 2002: vi). In addition, the last days of the run-up to the handing over of sovereignty over Hong Kong from Britain to China were clouded by a struggle between the Chinese and British governments over the future political arrangements for Hong Kong.3 Seeking to protect their interests, Hong Kong people were also drawn into the struggle.4 As a result, on the eve of the handover in 1997, there was a great deal of skepticism locally and in the international community over Beijing’s commitment to the “one country, two systems” arrangement. Although the sociopolitical situation in Hong Kong in the first few months after the handover turned out to be unexpectedly stable (Lau 1998b), the SAR soon suffered the blows and challenges of a rapidly deteriorating economy triggered by the Asian financial crisis and the bursting of the local real estate bubble. In addition, during this period the new SAR government, headed by Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, continued to experience rising public discontent over its frequent policy and executive errors and over the political conservatism it shared with Beijing in responding to calls for a faster pace of local democratization and other political issues (Wong 2002). The accumulation of public discontent eventually exploded in
a massive demonstration on July 1, 2003, involving more than half a million people protesting against the SAR government and demanding greater democracy. The incident attracted much international attention and strained people’s confidence in the “one country, two systems” arrangement.5 The incident also heightened Beijing’s sense of political crisis with regard to Hong Kong, prompting it to employ both economic and political measures to stabilize the political situation in the SAR and to appease the people of Hong Kong (Wong and Wan 2005: 209). These measures included permitting a sharp increase in the number of mainland tourists allowed to visit Hong Kong (the Individual Travel Scheme), the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement between Hong Kong and the Chinese Mainland (CEPA), which gives Hong Kong better access to the China market, and the eventual removal in March 2005 of the unpopular Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa.
