ABSTRACT
In this chapter I present an account of what is distinctive about restorative justice as a way of responding to offenders. I start with Howard Zehr’s highly influential presentation of restorative justice as a new paradigm of criminal justice, an alternative to the retributive paradigm which, he contends, has dominated understandings of crime and justice in the West for several centuries (Zehr 1990: chs. 5-6).1 As we shall see, Zehr’s retributive-restorative justice oppositional contrast has recently been criticised by some supporters of restorative justice as both misleading and, for those interested in developing restorative justice, counterproductive (Daly 2000a; Barton 2000). While I share many of the misgivings expressed by such critics, I think there is still considerable value in starting with that contrast. In presenting restorative justice as an alternative paradigm to retributive justice, Zehr made many important criticisms of the latter – especially its obsession with individual guilt. Some important aspects of this critique are in danger of being ‘forgotten’ by recent proponents and practitioners. Dropping these highly critical elements may give the restorative justice campaign a better chance of influencing government policy on crime. The price to pay for such practical success, however, could be a loss of what is most interesting and challenging about restorative justice.
