Sustainability as a policy telos

Efficiency, effectiveness and good reasons are key elements of legitimate rule. Political theory, as we saw in the previous chapter, tends to look for good reasons at the level of principles; in a world of political pluralization however, an overlapping consensus on basic political principles is – almost by definition – absent. In this chapter, I therefore want to consider another foundation for legitimate political cooperation based on good reasons: the policy telos. A policy telos is a policy aim that more or less causes itself to come into existence – hence its status as ‘telos’ – cf. Rawls’ (1999a) notion of a just society practically ‘inventing’ itself. Rather than defining precisely what the goals of policies are and by what criteria (shared principles) the results should be assessed, the role of policy teloi is to unite stakeholders and actors on particular policies, regardless of the aims each one hopes to reach. Thus, for instance, ‘sustainable development’ has in practice been used as such a telos. The parties involved in environmental policy do not agree on what it is they hope to achieve: there are many mutually exclusive conceptions of a sustainable society, and the added notion of development only further complicates any discussion. Yet on a practical level, these same parties could and often did agree on the policies to be pursued. Policy teloi are not a ‘cure’ for political pluralization; they only add an

extra instrument to the toolbox of philosopher and politician. The concept is useful only under specific circumstances, including rough equality of power among all parties involved, parties being involved (having a stake) in the first place, and substantive disagreement on principles. I shall illustrate both the benefits and disadvantages of a policy telos, using sustainable development as an example. In doing so, I have to make several assumptions, some purely for the sake of simplicity, others because they define the circumstances under which a policy telos can be effective. I assume political pluralization (globalization and dehierarchization) to

have resulted in an international ‘society’ made up of institutional actors, though not in the context of an international Hobbesian anarchy. I assume these actors to have varying degrees of relative autonomy and independence,

varying degrees of claims to formal-legal sovereignty, and to have moral, economic, legal and other ties of varying strength among one another – states, NGOs, inter-and supranational organizations, mobile, regional or global economic actors, etc. Despite their claims to sovereignty, and despite the different capabilities they may have (alone or in combinations) over other actors, I assume states to be actors with powers roughly equal to that of others. This is partly for technical reasons (the arguments can be adapted to fit a more complicated international ‘society’, but complications are not what we need at the moment), partly for normative reasons (which will be explained in a moment), and partly because I believe it is a realistic condition. Weaker parties can form coalitions, can sometimes block agreements or unilateral policies by stronger actors, etc.; in the long run, the ‘powerpoor’ still have instruments to block the ‘power-rich’ or even to have their own way. Voluntary political cooperation is highly problematic, and can even be

impossible under conditions of moral pluralism and equal distribution of political power between actors. A policy telos can, other things being equal, generate or sustain political cooperation in such a pluralistic non-hierarchic political reality. Stable political cooperation is based on two kinds of agreement: substantial and strategic. The (‘reasonable’) idea of substantial agreement assumes political actors to be moral agents who act on their authentic moral beliefs. It therefore requires a shared normative standpoint. This is a non-hierarchic type of solution, which is typically designed for the problem of moral pluralism. The (‘rational’) idea of strategic agreement assumes that people are rational instrumentalists who maximize their selfish interests. It therefore seeks to establish a possible convergence of rational self-interest on a certain policy. This type of agreement is more traditional, and rests on the full comparability of alternatives. It assumes the irreducible plurality of actors, but not necessarily a plurality of conceptions of the good. An effective policy telos can generate or sustain one or both of those types of agreement. A combination of them is theoretically inconsistent, but realistically possible: political action can be interpreted from, and (though not at the same time by the same actor) inspired by, both perspectives. The condition of moral pluralism suggests that the source of the problem

of political cooperation lies in the fact that political actors will generally find it very difficult (or even impossible) to agree on the policies that (actors within) the international ‘society’ ought or ought not to pursue, and on the way in which they ought to be pursued. If we assume actors (individuals, states, NGOs, etc.) are driven by, and act on, their authentic moral beliefs, then for political cooperation to arise there must be at least some level of agreement on the reasons for pursuing certain policies (problem definition), on the goals they should realize (solutions), and on the way in which they ought to be pursued (the rules of the ‘game’). Such an agreement is defined as substantial consensus. The three dimensions together define the political meaning of a general concept like sustainable development.