The need to interfere

Do we really need a state? In this chapter, I shall argue that we do, in some form or other, need one thing a state ideally provides: authoritative, decisive interference in, and for the benefit of, mutually advantageous schemes of cooperation. In the absence of truly sovereign nation-states – i.e. in a politically pluralized world – states alone cannot cope with, and we cannot ignore, at least some effects of unrestrained and unorganized social interaction. This raises the questions that will be addressed in subsequent chapters: can we design alternatives to the state, alternative institutions or policies aimed directly or indirectly at the creation of a limited degree of order among competing authorities and rules, and aimed at the creation of some limited sort of reference frame or polity? Can they be legitimized, and if so how? In what kind of world do we live, if not one of sovereign nation-states? I shall begin by offering an argument for ‘authoritative interference’ in

society based on one special case, environmental policy, and later generalize the argument by broadening its premises and conclusion. The argument runs as follows: since private actors cannot guarantee environmentally sound behaviour, state interference is needed. The argument also applies under different circumstances, however – the need for authoritative and decisive interference exists in any social and political constellation, not merely within sovereign states, and it exists in areas other than environmental policy. Yet political pluralization by definition precludes the existence of an agent with the necessary clout to warrant the necessary degree of interference. Simply ‘coping’ with political pluralization, simply using the classic tools of the state (including international treaty organizations) is therefore insufficient to guarantee effective and efficient policies, let alone policies that are legitimate in broader senses. To create conditions under which coping might be effective, more is needed: new approaches towards political problem solving and new institutional structures – the issues addressed in the next eight chapters. The initial argument for authoritative interference focuses on environ-

mental politics, a case that requires some introduction and background. Particularly in what we may by now call classical (1970s-1980s) ecological or

green thought, the cause of environmental problems was sought in a lack of limits to human consumption – hence in the economic sphere – in what I shall refer to as the ‘demand’ side of the equation (cf. Wissenburg 1998). This absence of limits would stimulate consumption of natural resources for the sake of economic growth rather than necessary production only, and consumption of both natural and produced goods for the sake of consumption itself rather than for a human or (less anthropocentrically expressed) greater good. Now definitions of environmental problems differ. For classical and modern radical greens (i.e. radical relative to the other party; I shall refer to them henceforth as ecologists), what we are dealing with is a global crisis which threatens the survival of the ecology, the biological system of which humans are (but) part. For less radical greens (whom I shall refer to as environmentalists) the problem is one of a mismatch between humans and their (separately existing) environment, wherein the latter does not meet the needs of the former. Judgments on what would make a solution desirable differ accordingly.

Most classical greens, for example, are unwilling to accept supply-side solutions, i.e. technological improvements in the efficiency of our use of natural resources or in the amount of resources made available. Supply-side solutions do not address human hubris, they do not respect nature (as valuable) in itself, and they only postpone the inevitable: the day when we reach the limits of growth. The same applies to distributive solutions (e.g. a world-wide, fairer distribution of access to resources, wealth, knowledge and technology): they only displace and at best postpone problems. Demand-side solutions necessarily have a political dimension: interference

with the parameters and input of economic processes requires political support at least in the form of abstention from interference, and more often direct and active political involvement. The justification of (these and other) policies is a central concern for political theory. Mainstream political theory, however, although acutely aware of the importance of the economic basis for social and political life, tends to black-box the economic sphere of the free market. Its normal approach to economics is to discuss the necessary sideconstraints to, or limits of, market freedom. In other words, mainstream political theory seems interested only in controlling the market from outside, in reining it in. Being strangely conservative in this respect, green political theory (both

ecological and environmental) tends to be split along the same lines as mainstream political theory: between libertarians or proponents of classical liberal solutions on the one hand, and all the rest – socialists, social liberals, etc. – on the other. A majority of green political theorists advocate financial and legal (dis)incentives to force trade and industry into ‘greening’ its activities: taxes, subsidies, fines, control agencies, etc. (cf. Dobson 1998, 2000a). Free market environmentalists (e.g. Anderson and Leal 1991, 1994, Oksanen 2003), the libertarians among green political theorists, expound an often extreme faith in the environmentally benign side-effects of private ownership

of natural resources and ‘hence’ of the free market’s capacity for environmental self-regulation. I shall question both hypotheses: the sanctity of government interference

and the sanctity of the free market. I shall first briefly discuss the two hypotheses in Section 3.2. Subsequently (in Section 3.3), I shall argue that, given the conditions under which environmentally benign production and consumption pays off, the kind of payoff structure that promotes green consumerism and producerism does not arise naturally, but rather has to be consciously created. Hence, free market environmentalism has to be taken with at least one pinch of salt. Next, in Section 3.4, I try to identify the factors that determine the payoff structure – as well as the actors who can influence these factors. Section 3.5 discusses whether the creation of environmentally benign payoff structures necessarily requires government interference (coercion) and with which (dis)incentives, or whether there remains room for two other classic forms of social cooperation (self-regulation and coordination). I shall argue that this room does exist (pace mainstream political theory), and discuss some options for self-regulation and for coordination via (dis)incentives originating in civil society, in the shape of moral and positive side-constraints. In Section 3.6, I briefly discuss the ‘greening’ potential of each of these strategies, i.e. with which kind of nature or ecology they could leave us. I also argue that we should not overvalue the borders between political theory, economics and moral theory. There is room for, and a want of, discussions of market and business ethics in political theory, of preference formation in economics, and of rational choice theory within business ethics. The concluding Section 3.7 carries, as promised, the argument for authoritative interference beyond the realm of environmental politics within a sovereign nation-state to politics in general under the circumstances of political pluralization.