ABSTRACT
As this chapter will reveal, Kagan’s analysis captures an important aspect of European grand strategy in the American world order. At the same time, however, it downplays two equally important aspects. The aspect captured by Kagan is that the grand strategies of Europe and the United States differ as regards the means of statecraft. When should a state choose military power over bilateral or multilateral diplomacy in order to achieve its goals? Europeans and Americans have developed distinctively different answers to this question. However, two important aspects of European grand strategy are downplayed in Kagan’s analysis. First, ‘Europe’ is not a unitary actor; rather, it is shorthand for the various national interests in the European region. These interests are occasionally expressed in concert through the EU, but often they are not. Regarding European grand strategy in the American world order, two positions can be discerned: an Atlanticist position, with Great Britain as the primary protagonist, and a Europeanist position, with France and Germany as the most important protagonists. The second aspect downplayed by Kagan is that Americans and Europeans fundamentally agree on the goals for the current world order. Their interests and values intersect more than they diverge, and they identify virtually the same set of challenges to these interests and values.
