ABSTRACT
The chapters in this first main section of the book lay down the theoretical groundwork for the discussion. How should we go about the task of defining and distinguishing individuals and organisations and how should we seek to understand the actions of these two entities, for purposes of evaluating such actions and then allocating responsibility? In this section, we need to move from the ontological (in what sense do either individuals or organisations exist?) to the normative (on what basis may we and do we interpret and pass judgment on their actions?). In order to answer such questions it is necessary to draw upon a number of intellectual disciplines and a range of existing writing and research: the sociology of organisations; the philosophy of collective action; and the jurisprudence of identity, legal personality, agency and responsibility. It will be seen that these disciplines, albeit from their own perspectives, sometimes address the same questions and produce parallel argument. That they do not always meet each other is perhaps not surprising, but can be instructive. So, we can see that the sociologists, the moral philosophers, the jurists and the lawyers have all, using their own methods and vocabulary, grappled with the grand ontological issue: does the organisation, as a collectivity, exist separately from its individual human members – is it a human aggregate, or is it an autonomous non-human-yethuman actor and agent? Not surprisingly, in each discipline we find opposing schools of thought and an unresolved question.1 It is
important to appreciate and grasp hold of this underlying theoretical uncertainty.
