ABSTRACT

During Chen Shui-bian’s first year in power, cross-strait relations were highly fluid. There was little mutual trust as each side harbored deep suspicions of the intentions of the other. This sense of great uncertainty led both to adopt a so-called “two-handed policy” – one public, the other hidden. For Taiwan, an excellent example is MAC chairwoman Tsai Ing-wen’s remark that the DPP would “implement Two-States Theory, but not mention it.” Beijing also accelerated its military buildup, particularly in regard to a Taiwan scenario, while tendering some olive branches to test out Taipei’s new policy direction. The US played a more active and balanced role than previously. But entering the final year of his term, President Clinton was unable to fashion a new cross-strait landscape. The best he could do was to stabilize the situation. For the most part, the initiative fell back to Taipei, especially to the newly-inaugurated President Chen. However, while the Five Nos that he forwarded in his inaugural address served to alleviate tension somewhat, another set of “Five Nos,” which would truly define Taipei’s mainland policy during his first year in power, was surreptitiously taking shape.