ABSTRACT
One of the long-standing debates in the literature on party unity is that federal and politically decentralized systems are expected to erode levels of party cohesion (Owens 2003; Ozbudun 1970). In such settings, the territorial aspect of party organization is not a purely administrative device for running day-to-day party business, but has important power-related implications, with regional branches holding significant levels of decision-making autonomy. These regional branches often operate as relatively autonomous organizations within the national party organization. Regional party leaders are thus agents with double loyalties, acting simultaneously as representatives of territorial-based interests and as representatives of the general interest of their national party. In national parliaments, when these interests clash, MPs might well coalesce around their territorial commitments rather than obey the party line (Ozbudun 1970: 355), with important consequences for the national government’s policy-making ability and, ultimately, its survival in office.
