ABSTRACT
As I mentioned in Chapter 1, the Humean view of motivation is widely accepted among contemporary western philosophers. In Chapter 2 I outlined the Humean view in the following way. All action is motivated by a desire and a means-end belief. My desire for a coffee, for example, might combine with my belief that in order to have a coffee I must go to the café, and produce the action of walking to the café. In more complex cases, the desire that combines with a belief to produce action is a desire for a means, and is itself the product of an additional desire and means-end belief. My desire to remain alert, for example, might combine with my belief that in order to remain alert I must have a coffee, to produce my desire for a coffee. The Humean view, then, consists of at least two claims. First, all action is motivated by a desire. Second, any desire for a means is motivated by some additional desire.
