ABSTRACT

Having established that Golkar’s organizational infrastructure is actually not as well institutionalized as is often assumed, the analysis now moves on to the second structural dimension of Randall and Svåsand’s model of party institutionalization. Decisional autonomy is arguably the most contentious part of the concept, not least because political theorists have so far failed to reach a consensus on the question of whether autonomy is actually a necessary dimension of party institutionalization or not. Randall and Svåsand believe that autonomy should be included in the concept, provided that the analytical focus is limited to the crucial issue of internal decision-making processes. In other words, a party is well institutionalized in this dimension if it can make important policy decisions autonomously and independently from external influences. According to this understanding of autonomy, links between a party and a sponsoring organization outside the formal party structure are acceptable as long as ‘the party is clearly the dominant element in the relationship’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 13). Indeed, in such cases, ‘a degree of interdependence could have very positive consequences, in terms of extending resources (which could be vitally needed) and, indeed, of external institutionalization’ (Randall and Svåsand 2002a: 13).1

On the other hand, connections are regarded as negative if the external actor severely compromises a party’s ability to shape its own policies and strategies, and to appoint its own personnel. With this limited focus, the authors argue, the complexities of defining the nature of a party’s links with external actors may be avoided.