ABSTRACT
Messages from other theatres of the war were not always so readily understood or acted upon as that occasioned by the egregious Dieppe raid. In the Western Atlantic and particularly in the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico, for instance, the Allies either failed to appreciate or chose to ignore the degree to which the Uboat was carving up mercantile trade in those seas. In many cases it came down to a simple question of priorities. Much of the local and regional mercantile trade – especially in perishable items – would continue to be carried independently by cargo ships in these waters until more warships were made available for escort duty and the authorities could begin to organise convoy facilities to protect the steamers and small craft engaged in this trade. Crudely put, unless these cargoes were important internationally, or to the war effort specifically, they would remain on a relatively low rung of importance in Admiralty thinking. All the while the trade was carried on in an unprotected way, a relatively small number of U-boats feasted upon it with relish. In a seven-month spell from 3 June onwards, for example, Dönitz committed a total of forty-six U-boats and an Italian submarine – often in groups of three or four at a time – to the Caribbean and Gulf of Mexico sinking at least 185 ships (926,153 tons) for the loss of only five of his U-boats. This scale of devastation could not be tolerated for long and a ‘through’ convoy system already resorted to on the East Coast of the US in mid-May had to be extended further into the West Atlantic as the summer of 1942 reached its peak. Once again the convoy system worked its magic reducing the number of easy kills for Dönitz’s craft, but there were still hunting grounds, such as off the southeast coast of Trinidad and off the West African coast in the Central Atlantic, where the U-boat could perform to his overall satisfaction.1
