ABSTRACT
Publicly announced negotiation positions are self-committing statements of the member states. With the same statements, member states indicate their internal restrictions. Furthermore, they promise to implement agreements once they are reached – i.e. confirm that they actually have the capacity to enforce them domestically. How can initial bargaining demands/offers be presented credibly? Referring to game-theoretic literature, we have shown that communication during negotiations may be used strategically – to gain time, or to deceive the opponent about one’s own intentions and capacities. How can states convince each other that their statements correspond to the facts and thereby avoid making concessions? Note that concessions imply moving away from the initially declared position (see Hovi 1998: 61). This is one of the main themes in Schelling’s book The Strategy of Conflict (1960). The meaning of the concept of ‘commitment’ is complex, because it expresses at the same time the passive restriction of an actor, as well as his or her obligations and reasoned decision.
