ABSTRACT
When the Indian Ocean tsunami struck on 26 December, 2004, Aceh was still under emergency rule. The martial law status that had been in place since the collapse of the limited peace process between the Megawati administration and GAM had been downgraded to civil emergency rule in May 2004. Despite this, little had changed in terms of the unabated fighting on the ground. After almost two years of intensive counterinsurgency operations Indonesia’s security forces had severely weakened GAM’s military capacity and had regained control over Aceh’s urban centres, forcing the rebels to retreat to the countryside. Yet, while Jakarta’s repressive approach had succeeded in reasserting Indonesian authority over the most densely populated parts of Aceh, it had failed to achieve its goal of crushing GAM and the war continued in the province’s rural areas. Three days before the tsunami, Aceh’s regional military commander Major General Endang Suwarya announced that 2,500 GAM combatants with 844 guns remained at large (Mediaindo, 23 December, 2004), indicating that the military saw its mission in Aceh as being far from over.
