“Newly born Russia” and Japan

The end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and other related transformations did not bring a successful resolution of the territorial dispute that continues to figure centrally in Japan’s relations with its northern neighbor. Furthermore, the rejection of communism and the embracing of a market economy and democracy by Russia’s new leadership did not lead to incorporation of Russia into the realm of Japan’s political “self.” Rather, Russia’s difference was reconfigured and the “self/other” nexus was restructured in such a way that it reconfirmed Japan’s identity as a capitalist democracy. The process and the manifestations of this transformation of the “self/other” nexus will be explored in this chapter. Certain transformations in the political discourse had already started to

take place during the last years of the Soviet Union. Compared with other members of the Western camp, the Japanese response to the Soviet “new thinking” was slow and cautious (Shimotomai 1995 and Hasegawa 2007: 61), as the Japanese agenda vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was largely determined by the territorial dispute. This said, however, some important changes in the Japanese discourse on the Soviet Union can be recognized from the late 1980s (Ferguson 2007: 203). To a certain extent, these changes constituted a reflection on Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s broader reforms and the gradual dissipation of the Cold War conflict, but more important, they emerged in response to Japan-related initiatives undertaken by the new leadership, which culminated in Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo in April 1991 (Kimura 1991). Gorbachev’s request for financial aid remained largely unanswered (Nimmo 1994: 98-101) and the Japanese public, unlike their counterparts in other major Western nations, remained generally skeptical about the changes taking place in the Soviet Union (for example, see public opinion polls in Berton 1992a). The domestic political discourse, however, started to shift gradually from ultimate otherness towards narrating temporal difference between Japan and the Soviet Union. Namely, the Soviet Union was reconstructed as a nation

that was in the early stages of implementing the universal values of democracy, personal freedom and the rule of law. In this process Japan’s political “self” was reaffirmed as a mature representative of these values, and hence as a provider of guidance and assistance to the Soviet Union (for example Prime Minister Kaifu’s speech at Karuizawa LDP seminar, 28 July 1991 at TD). As a manifestation of this shift in identity discourse, the Japanese position, which from the early 1980s tied economic aid to progress on the territorial issue, began to show a gradual softening but this did not lead to drastic policy reassessments. It was the August 1991 coup attempt which convinced the Japanese leadership of the importance of the changes taking place in the Soviet Union; in its wake, Japan finally announced a program of limited economic aid to the Soviet Union (Hasegawa 2000a: 169). The Soviet Union, however, ceased to exist as a state only six months after

Gorbachev’s visit to Tokyo and less than four months after Japan announced the financial aid package. The evolution of the identity discourse thus continued vis-à-vis newly independent Russia, which inherited from the Soviet Union the legal and political relations with Japan, the policy of military build-up in the Far East and, most importantly, the territorial dispute. The reconfiguration of the “self/other” nexus was rather slow, as it worked against the Cold War symbiosis of the political and the socio-cultural, the pervasiveness of which received a further boost from the lack of visible progress in the territorial dispute as well as the domestic instability in Russia, often perceived in Japan as manifestations of Russia’s national character (for example, see Ochiai 1992). Other incidents, such as the revelations of Russian nuclear waste dumping into the Sea of Japan, were also seen as confirmations of the prevalence of national character as the decisive factor in determining Russia’s policies (for example, Nakanishi 1993: 169). As Tsuyoshi Hasegawa noted, “in the minds of many Japanese, the Soviet Union was merely replaced by Russia and there were no fundamental changes in the problems that existed between the two countries” (Hasegawa 2007: 62 also see Shimotomai 1995: 122-3 and Ferguson 2008: 74-6). Thus, in spite of Russia’s acceptance of the “common language” of free-

dom, democracy and market economy (Tamba 2000: 29-38) and repetitious proclamations from the Russian leadership that the new Russia was fundamentally different from the Soviet Union, sharing with Japan important “humanistic values” (Sato-and Komaki 2003: 25), the process of reconfiguration of the “self/other” nexus was impeded by the dominance of a sociocultural construct that downplayed the possibility of genuine Russian transformation. Hence, while the 1992 LDP policy manifesto announced the “collapse of the Cold War structure” and the emergence of a new international order and new threats (LDP 1992: 3), the political establishment, particularly the defense community, continued to view changes in Russia with great suspicion, often criticizing the Americans and Europeans as being overly optimistic in their enthusiasm about the changes taking place (for example, Vice-Minister of Defense Miyahara at House of Representatives,

National Security Committee, 14 April 1992 at NDL). This skepticism was also evident in the Japanese policy makers’ persistent reluctance to provide large-scale economic assistance to Russia, justified by arguments that economic aid cannot change the Russian character (for example, Yomiuri Shimbun, 1992). Yeltsin’s cancellation of what was to be his first visit to Japan as the President of independent Russia gave a further boost to the validity of the socio-cultural construct. In early September 1992, at virtually the last moment, Yeltsin abruptly announced the postponement of his visit, explaining this move to Russia’s domestic audience as a reaction to “Japan’s intransigence on the territorial issue” (Nimmo 1994: 149), as evidenced by Japanese insistence on including the reference to the territorial dispute in the G-7 statement at the Munich Summit few months before the scheduled visit. The cancellation of the visit was extensively covered by the Japanese press and many commentators presented it as a confirmation of the continuing relevance of national character for analysis of Russia. Unlike the American “Russophobic pessimists” who often tended to resort to a quasi-religious discourse to explain Russia’s abnormality (Foglesong 2007: 197), the Japanese narrative was drawn from and reproduced the socio-cultural discourse on the “original forms” (genkei) of both nations. Yeltsin’s attitude and manners were portrayed as a manifestation of essentially Russian characteristics which are neither Western nor Eastern. Again, Russia’s paradoxical, traitorous, cunning and calculating character was contrasted with Japanese consistency and integrity. Incompatible with both Western ethics and Eastern logic, Yeltsin’s sudden cancellation of his visit to Japan was argued to be an absurd paradox, explicable only in the context of Russian national character (for example, Nakanishi 1993: 172-3). Underscoring the omnipresence of this construct, even the progressive Asahi Shimbun, whose interpretation of current events rarely converges with the positions of either the governmental or the more Right-leaning press, featured an editorial that interpreted the situation in Russia in socio-cultural terms and downplayed the importance of the collapse of the Soviet Union in shaping Russia’s foreign policy. Drawing examples from Russia’s history it portrayed an unchanging Russian national mentality of a people under siege, dominated by general insecurity and fear of being invaded, as the key to understanding Russia’s policies (Asahi Shimbun 1993: 1-2). The consistent prevalence of this construct, however, cannot be understood

solely within the context of bilateral relations. As was the case in other periods, Japanese discourse on Russia was also very much a reflection of evolving relations with the West, (read: with the US). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a decade of trade frictions, together with the disappearance of the Soviet threat, led to the re-emergence of a discourse on Japan’s otherness, somewhat reminiscent of the “yellow peril” discourse of the first half of the twentieth century that presented Japan as the emerging enemy of the West. Its structure, which drew on the “traditional” racial and cultural stereotypes to narrate Japan’s threatening “otherness” was captured perfectly in the title of a New

York Times article surveying the literature: “The Land of the Rising Threat” (McDowell 1990). The instability of Japan’s position within the West was further enhanced by the undermined relevance of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which had posited the Soviet Union as the prime potential enemy. In light of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and relatively close relations between Russia and its former Western foes, the legitimacy of the security treaty came into question as the alliance lost its “presumed enemy.” This decline in the alliance’s legitimacy, combined with worries about the “rise of China” and the US-China “strategic partnership” of the early 1990s, led to an acute sense of insecurity in Japan about the future of its partnership with the US, as suggested in the title of Alliance Adrift (Do-mei hyo-ryu-[1997]), published by one of Japan’s leading journalists, Funabashi Yo-’ichi. Thus, in a rather paradoxical fashion, the socio-cultural construction of Japan through Russia, the emergence of which was facilitated by the Cold War, was now preserved as the result of the collapse of the Cold War structure. Through narration of Russia’s difference, it responded to the instability in Japan’s location within the West and reinforced the construction of Japan as an integral part of the universal realm of normalcy and at the same time as a unique nation. It was not until October 1993 that Yeltsin’s visit materialized, and this only

after Japan, succumbing to pressure from the US and other G-7 members, pledged US$1.8 billion in aid to Russia as part of the G-7 package and demonstrated awillingness to take a less rigid position on the territorial dispute (Meyer 1993: 965). In the summit with Japan’s Prime Minister Hosokawa, Yeltsin stressed Russia’s desire to develop its relations with Japan on the basis of “law and justice.” These two concepts have since been adopted by the Japanese policy discourse and become the main keywords in discussions of bilateral relations, particularly in the context of the territorial dispute. In the bilateral Tokyo Declaration, Yeltsin committed himself to the resolution of the territorial issue and pledged to honor all bilateral agreements concluded by the Soviet Union. He refused, however, to make a specific reference to the Joint Declaration of 1956, in which the Soviet Union promised to transfer two islands to Japan after the conclusion of a permanent peace treaty. Importantly, however, during his visit Yeltsin did publicly apologize for the Soviet internment of the Japanese PoWs in the aftermath of World War II. This apology was welcomed by the Japanese establishment as a sign of a significant change in Russia’s attitude toward Japan (Hasegawa 2000a:184-6). It is around this time that the socio-cultural construct started its retreat

from the general discourse on Russia, operating mainly in the realm of the territorial dispute. At the same time, the conception of Russia as a new country started to gain prominence in mainstream debates. Gradually, Russia came to be referred to as “newly born Russia” (shinsei roshia), to underline discontinuity with both the Soviet Union and historical “Russia” (for example, Minister of Foreign Affairs Hata Tsutomu at House of Representatives, 14 October 1993 at NDL). This distinction was also emphasized in a speech

by Prime Minister Miyazawa when, in discussing Japan’s relations with Russia, he contrasted the “expansionist” Stalinist policies of the Soviet Union with the “new Russia,” a country on its way to becoming a “true member” of international society (speech on occasion of elections to the House of Representatives, 10 July 1993 at TD). A similar distinction between Russia and the Soviet Union can be witnessed in the speeches of Suzuki Muneo, a Diet Member from Hokkaido, who, until he was brought down by the corruption scandal in 2002, was one of key post-Cold War actors in Japan’s policy vis-à-vis Russia. While Suzuki had earlier adopted a rather uncompromising stance toward Russia, this began to change from around late 1993. He became one of the main champions of “new Russia,” stressing the need to differentiate between the “nyet (no) saying” USSR and the “new” Russia which had embarked on the process of democratization and transition to a market economy (for example, at House of Representatives, Foreign Affairs Committee, 15 October 1993 and 28 November 1994 at NDL). Principally as a result of political instability in both countries, there was

little movement in bilateral relations between Yeltsin’s visit in 1993 and 1996. In Russia, the nationalistic mood was on the rise and Yeltsin’s popularity and his political power were significantly undermined, with the majority of the parliamentary seats occupied by the opposition consisting of communists and nationalists after the 1995 elections. In Japan, in 1994, a coalition government of the two rivals, the Socialist Party and the LDP, was formed, headed by the Socialist Murayama Tomiichi. Lack of unity meant that little progress in foreign policy was achieved during the two years of the Murayama cabinet.