ABSTRACT
The Likud-led government decided on 5 June 1982 to order the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) to enter south Lebanon. The official goal was to eliminate the Palestinian military threat to the Israeli settlements in the northern part of the country.1 The cabinet decision was approved the following day by a great majority in the Knesset, including most opposition parties. But the national consensus in favor of the war in Lebanon gradually disintegrated. The realization that Operation Peace for Galilee, the official name for the war, had actually expanded beyond the initially stated goals and the discontent with the growing number of Israeli casualties, lessened support for the military intervention in Lebanon. The continued fighting, however, muted some of the criticism. At the beginning, most politicians preferred to express their doubts or criticism in closed forums, in spite of the fact that the media was voicing increased criticism of the war. Yet, following the August 1982 bombings of Beirut and particularly in the aftermath of the massacres of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps that were perpetrated by the Phalangist forces – Israel’s allies – opposition to the war became vocal and widespread.2 The discontent was visible not only among the politicians of the opposition, but also in the high echelons of the army, and even at the cabinet level. The war, its goals and the way it was run became the center of a bitter political debate that has not yet ended.
