ABSTRACT
Since 1998 civil society building has become an integral component of
international intervention. This timing reflects two developments. First, US
president Bill Clinton announced in June 1998 that the mandate of SFOR
peacekeepers would be extended indefinitely. In principle, this decision
allowed for the development of a long-term strategy for the consolidation of
a civil society pillar, instead of a short-term, crisis-driven approach. Second, after more than two years since the signing of the DPA, a profound dis-
appointment with top-down political strategies had emerged, suggesting the
need for a new approach. As seen in the last two chapters, Bosnia’s political
structure is highly fragmented and easy prey for nationalist parties. Inter-
national agencies have responded to continuing domestic deadlock by
imposing solutions and removing recalcitrant politicians. Although this
assertive approach has guaranteed short-term efficiency, it has also raised
fundamental questions about the sustainability of a democratisation process characterised by limited domestic ownership. Civil society provided inter-
national agencies with a promising avenue to complement institution build-
ing, sidestep domestic political leaders, soften and possibly overcome
domestic divisions, and promote reconciliation. Accordingly, growing
amounts of financial and human resources have been allocated to civil
society building programmes.
