ABSTRACT
The matter is introduced by Ryle in his 1938 article in a sufficiently striking way. It is, he says, a matter of some importance, ‘for not only is it the case that category-propositions (namely, assertions that terms belong to certain categories or types) are always philosopher’s propositions, but, I believe, the converse is also true. So we are in the dark about the nature of philosophical problems and methods if we are in the dark about types or categories.’1 In Philosophical Arguments (1946) he seems, though less explicitly, committed to the same view. It appears again, robustly enough, in the Introduction to The Concept of Mind (1949): ‘Philosophy is the replacement of category-habits by category-disciplines.’2 It is echoed in his declaration, made in the first chapter of that work, that the ‘official theory’ he is bent on destroying is ‘one big mistake . . . namely a category-mistake’;3 or, perhaps, a ‘family’ or ‘batch’ of category-mistakes.4
