ABSTRACT
In the last chapter the general nature of interpretation in contract law was examined. Areas of dispute, such as whether plain meaning of texts is possible and how the notion of ‘a contract’ should be understood, were noted. This chapter will examine more fully the approaches the courts adopt when interpreting contracts. The ‘rules of construction’ that the courts have traditionally applied will be briefly considered, before examining Lord Hoffmann’s restatement of the principles of contractual interpretation. Since Lord Hoffmann stated that the ‘intellectual baggage’ of legal interpretation has been discarded, it may be that the technical rules of construction are no longer relevant. Nevertheless, elements of that baggage will be briefly examined here to get an indication of the significance and direction of Lord Hoffmann’s change.1 The more significant features of Lord Hoffmann’s speech will be drawn out and explained. The difficulties with contextual interpretation will then be explored in Chapter 3.
